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Abstract
Background: Recruitment and retention of participants are both critical for the success of trials, yet both remain
significant problems. The use of incentives to target participants and trial staff has been proposed as one solution.
The effects of incentives are complex and depend upon how they are designed, but these complexities are often
overlooked. In this paper, we used a scoping review to ‘map’ the literature, with two aims: to develop a checklist on
the design and use of incentives to support recruitment and retention in trials; and to identify key research topics
for the future.
Methods: The scoping review drew on the existing economic theory of incentives and a structured review of the
literature on the use of incentives in three healthcare settings: trials, pay for performance, and health behaviour
change. We identified the design issues that need to be considered when introducing an incentive scheme to
improve recruitment and retention in trials. We then reviewed both the theoretical and empirical evidence relating
to each of these design issues. We synthesised the findings into a checklist to guide the design of interventions
using incentives.
Results: The issues to consider when designing an incentive system were summarised into an eight-question
checklist. The checklist covers: the current incentives and barriers operating in the system; who the incentive should
be directed towards; what the incentive should be linked to; the form of incentive; the incentive size; the structure
of the incentive system; the timing and frequency of incentive payouts; and the potential unintended
consequences. We concluded the section on each design aspect by highlighting the gaps in the current evidence
base.
Conclusions: Our findings highlight how complex the design of incentive systems can be, and how crucial each
design choice is to overall effectiveness. The most appropriate design choice will differ according to context, and
we have aimed to provide context-specific advice. Whilst all design issues warrant further research, evidence is
most needed on incentives directed at recruiters, optimal incentive size, and testing of different incentive structures,
particularly exploring repeat arrangements with recruiters.
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Background
Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) used to determine
the efficacy and effectiveness of new healthcare interven-
tions depend on successful recruitment and retention of
trial participants. Nevertheless, approximately 45% of tri-
als fail to recruit the necessary number of participants in
the time planned [1], a figure that has changed little over
time [2, 3]. Despite their importance, very little evidence
exists on effective methods to boost recruitment and re-
tention [4, 5].
The use of incentives in trials has been proposed as a
strategy to improve recruitment and retention [6]. An
incentive is generally defined as anything ‘that motivates
or encourages someone to do something’ [7], although
the use of the term in the context of trials tends to be
narrower. Whilst incentives are often financial, they can
take many forms in the trial context. The effects of in-
centives are complex and depend on how they are de-
signed, the form in which they are given, how they
interact with other motivations, and what happens after
they are withdrawn [8].
The aim of this paper is to use a scoping review to
‘map’ the literature, with two aims: to develop a checklist
on the design and use of incentives to support recruit-
ment and retention in trials; and to identify key research
topics in this area for the future.
Methods
We conducted a ‘scoping review’, which is an appropri-
ate methodology for ‘mapping the field’ in terms of the
existing evidence around incentives in trials, and for pro-
viding initial guidance to assist decision-making about
how incentives might be used to support recruitment
and retention in trials [9, 10]. We reported the study ac-
cording to the new guidelines for scoping reviews [11].
There was no review protocol.
We sought to identify literature relevant for informing
the design and implementation of incentive schemes in
trials. We drew on theoretical literature about incentives
and the issues in their design that are important, as well
as empirical literature examining these design issues in
practice. Theoretical and empirical literature was identi-
fied using our prior knowledge of the seminal works in
this area, and additional empirical literature was identi-
fied through a structured search of PubMed and EconLit
(the search strategies are provided in the Appendix). As
the literature on the use of incentives in trials is limited,
we drew upon evidence from two other healthcare set-
tings in which incentives are commonly used: pay for
performance, and health behaviour change. The ORCCA
database was launched in September 2016, bringing to-
gether published studies and ‘work in progress’ on re-
cruitment [12]. We updated our search in September
2018 by assessing studies relating to ‘incentives’ in the
ORCCA database.
The focus of this review was on issues relating to the
design of incentives, aimed at both participants who are
being recruited or retained and those doing the recruit-
ment and retention. When drawing on literature exam-
ining the use of incentives in other healthcare settings,
the evidence on pay for performance in healthcare is
likely to be most informative in terms of recruiter incen-
tives as pay-for-performance incentives tend to target
providers rather than patients. The evidence on the use
of incentives for health behaviour change, on the other
hand, largely examines patient-directed incentives, and
so is likely to be most relevant to incentives aimed at
participants who are being recruited or retained.
Although we highlight some ethical issues, a detailed
consideration of the ethical issues surrounding incen-
tives was beyond the scope of this paper. An overview of
the issues can be found in the NHS Health Research Au-
thority guidance on payments and incentives in research
[13].
We first examined the identified papers, searching for
the key design issues which were evident in the theoret-
ical or empirical literature known to the authors or iden-
tified in the search. The design issues which emerged
from this initial examination were discussed among the
study team and eight key design issues were agreed
upon.
Once this list of design issues was agreed, we sought
to review the evidence pertaining to each. For each de-
sign issue, we first examined the literature from a trials
setting, starting with systematic reviews. If there were no
systematic reviews specific to the design aspect in the
trials, or the systematic reviews from a trials setting
found insufficient evidence to draw conclusions, we then
examined single studies from a trials setting, alongside
evidence from the two other settings (pay for perform-
ance and health behaviour change). Within the evidence
on pay for performance and health behaviour change,
we adopted the same approach of using systematic re-
views, and then single studies when reviews were not
available. Laboratory or field experiments and solely
qualitative studies were excluded. As with many scoping
studies, we did not assess the quality of the individual
reviews and studies [9].
The results are presented as issues to be considered
when designing an incentive scheme to improve recruit-
ment and retention in trials. For each issue, the relevant
economic theory is presented, followed by a summary of
the empirical evidence. This was then synthesised in
general guidance around incentive design, reflecting on
whether the theoretical predictions appear to be borne
out in practice. These recommendations are summarised
in a checklist to help design incentive schemes.
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Although we did not formally adopt the approach, our
analytical approach is in line with the realist approach,
moving away from specific statements about ‘what
works’ in favour of ‘contextual advice in the general for-
mat: in circumstances such as A, try B, or when imple-
menting C, watch out for D’ [14].
Results
The structured search identified 307 articles from Econ-
Lit and 685 articles from PubMed, presenting 963
unique records after duplicates were removed, and we
assessed 212 full-text articles for eligibility, of which 12
were included in the review (additional to those already
known to the authors). The search on ORCCA identified
361 studies, of which one additional study was included
in the review (see Fig. 1 for a PRISMA diagram modified
for the scoping review, and Additional file 1 identifies
which papers came from each search).
The theory of incentives
Economic theory would characterise the relationships
between the investigator, recruiters, and trial participants
as ‘contracts’ between a principal and multiple agents
[15]. In this relationship, the investigator (the principal)
contracts with recruiters (group 1 agents) to recruit and
retain participants (group 2 agents) into trials. Recruiters
incur time and financial costs associated with recruiting
and retaining participants in the trial. Participants may
incur direct costs such as travel expenses, and opportun-
ity costs in terms of time that could have been spent on
other activities. The problem for the investigator is to
boost both recruitment and retention, whilst obtaining a
representative pool of informed and engaged participants
who will complete the trial.
Currently, recruiters may be incentivised on the num-
ber of potential participants screened for eligibility or re-
cruited, not on their actual eligibility or other key factors
such as the quality of data collection and record-keeping
about recruitment processes. Participants may not be
directly incentivised at all.
Incentive theory states that the key is to align the par-
ties’ interests so that all agents (both those recruiting
and those participating) will choose the optimal effort
level that brings about the desired recruitment and re-
tention rates [15]. This can be achieved by tying the
benefit of the agents to that of the investigator, usually
by setting incentives that are linked to variations in some
measure of recruitment and retention rates and the ap-
propriateness of participants.
Design issues to consider
In the following we present the eight issues to consider
when designing an incentive scheme to improve recruit-
ment and retention. The relevant theoretical and
Fig. 1 Modified Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) diagram for scoping review. ORCCA, Online
Resource for Recruitment Research in Clinical Trials
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empirical evidence is summarised and recommendations
are made based on this. These are also summarised in
Table 1 as a checklist for incentive scheme designers to
follow.
What are the current incentives and barriers operating in
the system?
The first design issue to consider differs from the others,
in that it does not derive from a specific theory or relate
to particular empirical findings. Rather, here we high-
light the need to understand the current context into
which new incentive mechanisms are to be introduced.
When designing an incentive system, it is vital to con-
sider the existing incentives already operating in trials,
and the current barriers to recruitment and retention.
For participants, the potential to access new treatments
and altruistic benefits to wider society may act as incen-
tives to participate in trials. Participants in a system of
care free at the point of use may have different existing
incentives to those who face co-payments.
Participants may experience barriers to trial participa-
tion including additional demands such as attending ap-
pointments and associated time, effort, or financial costs,
discomfort associated with trial procedures, the risk of
not being allocated to their preferred treatment, and un-
certain outcomes [16].
Recruiters to trials may be researchers, specialist re-
cruiters, or clinicians. For specialist recruiters, their in-
come may be linked to trial recruitment. All may be
incentivised by the potential for improved care for par-
ticipants, altruism, career advancement, co-authorship of
scientific outputs, and the opportunity to keep up to
date with current research. Recruiters may face time
constraints and a lack of resources, with clinicians acting
as recruiters facing additional concerns over potential
threats to the doctor–patient relationship and a loss of
professional autonomy [16].
Conclusion
All institutional arrangements create incentives, even if
they are not explicitly labelled as such. Consideration of
the incentives created by the current context is a key
step frequently overlooked in the design of incentive
schemes. The most effective incentives are those that ad-
dress existing barriers. Incentives will have a muted ef-
fect if they conflict with existing incentives already
operating within the system. Transparency on current
systems of payments and incentives would be helpful to
inform further research into what works and in what
setting.
Who should incentives be directed towards?
Incentives could be directed to participants, recruiters
(individuals, teams or sites), or a combination.
Incentivising participants
Theory Individuals are motivated by actions that pro-
duce measurable and tangible benefits [17]. Many factors
working against trial participation are tangible (such as
time and travel costs), while benefits (such as health im-
provements, access to new treatments, or the wider ben-
efits of research) are often uncertain or occur far in the
future. In the context of screening or prevention, eco-
nomic theory suggests the use of subsidies or financial
incentives to correct for suboptimal health choices [18,
19]. Similarly, offering incentives to participants can pro-
vide an immediate tangible benefit which may offset
some barriers.
Evidence A Cochrane systematic review of strategies to
improve retention in randomised trials found that
provision of a monetary incentive was effective (relative
risk (RR) 1.18; 95% confidence interval (CI) 1.09 to 1.28)
[4]. Of the six strategies tested in the included studies,
monetary incentives demonstrated the clearest impact
on retention. However, the majority of the included
studies evaluated rates of questionnaire responses rather
than strategies to improve retention rates when partici-
pants are required to return to sites for follow-up assess-
ments. The 2018 update of the Cochrane review on
recruitment identified two studies and concluded that
incentives probably improve recruitment (risk differ-
ence = 4%; 95% CI = − 1% to 8%) [5]. This update in-
cluded a study where the financial incentive was
conditional upon attending a screening visit.
Incentivising recruiters
Theory Theory suggests that directly linking payment to
the individual responsible for improvement provides
stronger motivation than linking to groups (e.g. a whole
recruitment site) [20]. However, there may be a trade-off
between the power of incentives and the reliability of
performance monitoring when applied to individuals
[21]. When targeting groups, members may hope to
benefit from increased efforts from others rather than
increasing their own effort – so-called free riding [22].
Peer monitoring, and cooperation can reduce free-riding
[23]. Additionally, if barriers to recruitment or retention
are due to system failures, this is where incentives
should focus [24].
Evidence A systematic review of the effectiveness of
payment to healthcare professionals for recruitment of
participants to trials identified three relevant studies,
concluding that the evidence was very limited, of poor
quality, and inconclusive [25].
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Table 1 Checklist for incentive scheme design
Design aspect to
consider
Evidence Issues to consider Future research priorities
1. What are the
current incentives
and barriers
operating in the
system?
• Must complement the existing incentives
already operating in the setting, and work
to overcome the current barriers
• Consideration of the current state of play
in a field is a key step but is frequently
overlooked and can be affected by
availability of information
• What incentives are in the setting
already?
• What are the main barriers to
recruitment?
• Understanding current systems of
incentives operating in trials
2. Who should
incentives be
directed towards?
• Choice should depend on where the
greatest barriers exist, where
accountability for improvement lies, and
where the greatest gains may be achieved
for the available resource
• Whilst there is more evidence to support
patient incentives, all options show some
promise
• Where do the greatest barriers to
recruitment/retention currently lie?
With participants, recruiters, or both?
• If the barriers are with recruiters, do
individuals have the ability to
overcome these, or is a team effort
required?
• Testing organisational and individual
incentives for recruiters, and shared
incentive schemes
3. What should be
incentivised?
• Incentives linked to processes generally
found to be more effective than outcome-
linked incentives, although this evidence is
from settings other than trial recruitment
and retention
• There must be evidence of a strong causal
relationship between the incentivised
process and the desired outcome if
process-based incentives are to achieve
the overall aim
• What is the desired outcome?
Recruitment, retention, or both?
• Would linking incentives directly to
this outcome transfer unfair risk onto
participants or recruiters?
• What processes may lead to this
outcome? Is there evidence of a
strong causal relationship between
processes and this outcome?
• What other outcomes are important?
Will these be neglected if not
incentivised?
• Testing the relative benefits of process
and outcome incentives and of
incentivising a single metric
compared to a range of measures
4. What form of
incentive should be
offered?
• The psychological effects of monetary
incentives do not appear to crowd out
the direct price effect
• Monetary incentives were found to be
more effective than non-monetary incen-
tives for participants
• Who is the incentive directed
towards? What are they likely to
value most or be motivated by?
• Is it possible to provide monetary
incentives?
• What is the overall budget for
incentive provision?
• Testing of the relative effectiveness of
monetary compared to non-monetary
incentives for recruiters
5. How large should
the incentive be?
• Larger incentives should be more effective
• Size of incentive needed will be very
context dependent, increasing in
situations that require more effort from
participants or recruiters, or more risk
• Incentive size will determine the overall
cost of the scheme
• How are agents currently
reimbursed?
• How much effort is required from
participants or recruiters?
• How large is the risk associated with
trial involvement?
• What is the overall budget for
incentive provision?
• Would an incentive of the chosen
size raise concerns around coercion?
• Testing the cost-effectiveness of larger
incentives, accounting for the overall
impact on study timelines and costs
6. How should the
inventive be
structured?
• Incentive structure is crucial in
determining the total cost of the scheme
• Most effective structure will vary by the
context, and the evidence in this area is
sparse
• Evidence suggests there is no difference
in effectiveness between guaranteed and
lottery-based incentives for patient
incentives
• Repeat arrangements with recruiters may
warrant exploration of more complex
incentive structures
• Who is the incentive directed
towards?
• If directed towards recruiters, is this a
one-off situation or are repeat ar-
rangements likely?
• What is the overall budget for
incentive provision?
• Is budget certainty required from the
outset?
• Do agents face different barriers to
recruitment and retention?
• Exploration of the effects of more
complex incentive structures
7. When, and how
often, should
payments be made?
• Immediate incentives are generally found
to be more effective than those paid out
in the future
• The time between the occurrence of the
desired behaviour and the incentive
should be minimised
• When can incentives be practically
provided in the trial?
• Is it possible to provide multiple
incentives over time?
• Testing the benefits of multiple
incentives over time
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Reviews of the evidence from pay for performance in
healthcare suggest that both organisational and individ-
ual incentives can produce significant improvements in
activity [26], with larger effects generally found when
targeting smaller units (individuals/teams vs organisa-
tions) [27].
Incentives targeting both recruiters and participants in the
same study
Only one trial was identified that directly compared the
effectiveness of provider, patient, and shared incentives.
Whilst the outcome of interest was treatment adherence
rather than recruitment and retention, shared financial
incentives were found to be effective whereas incentives
to physicians or participants alone were not [28]. A sys-
tematic review of pay for performance found that whilst
combined incentives were rarely used, they did lead to
positive results in the two studies identified [27].
Conclusion The choice of who to incentivise should de-
pend on where the greatest barriers exist, where ac-
countability for improvement lies, and where the
greatest gains may be achieved. Whilst there is more evi-
dence to support participant incentives, all options show
some promise. The testing of organisational and individ-
ual incentives for recruiters, and shared incentive
schemes between recruiters and participants, should be
encouraged.
What should be incentivised?
Incentives could be linked to:
 Processes that may lead to increased recruitment
and retention (e.g. number of participants invited,
reminders sent)
 Outcomes (number of participants successfully
recruited or retained)
 A combination of processes and outcomes
Theory
In the simplest principal–agent framework, where
agents’ efforts and performance are perfectly observable,
incentives are linked to the desired outcome(s). How-
ever, outcomes are rarely determined solely by the ac-
tions of agents, and so become a ‘noisy’ signal of actual
effort [29]. Outcome-based incentives transfer risk to the
agent and may be inequitable, for example if some re-
cruiters are dealing with more complex populations and
must consequently work harder to recruit or retain each
additional participant. Linking incentives to process indi-
cators may therefore be more effective in inducing effort
as these are under the direct control of the agent [26].
However, there must be evidence of a strong causal rela-
tionship between the incentivised process and the desired
outcome if process incentives are to achieve the overall
aim of increasing recruitment and retention. There is a
danger that increases in process measures may not trans-
late into increased recruitment or retention, or may lower
the overall quality of the participant pool.
The role of agents is likely to comprise multiple tasks,
only some of which the investigator can verify and therefore
link to incentives. This multi-tasking problem can lead to
concerns that attaching a large incentive to only one task or
measure may lead to effort diversion away from other non-
incentivised tasks [30], such as recruitment over retention.
This is the case if tasks are substitutes, for example if they
are both time-consuming but unrelated. Alternatively, tasks
may be complements, meaning that improvements in one
area can lead to wider improvements in other areas [31].
Using a broad array of performance measures (including a
mix of process and outcome metrics) minimises the risk of
effort diversion, but increases the complexity and resources
required to implement the incentive scheme [32].
Evidence
No studies examining the effectiveness of process versus
outcome-based incentives for trial recruitment or reten-
tion were identified, but this issue has been examined in
Table 1 Checklist for incentive scheme design (Continued)
Design aspect to
consider
Evidence Issues to consider Future research priorities
8. What are the
potential unintended
consequences?
• In addition to their impact on recruitment
and retention, the introduction of
incentives may also result in unintended
consequences
• Incentives should be designed to
minimise the opportunities for individuals
to engage in undesirable behaviours, and
potential unintended consequences
should be monitored
• Is incentive provision likely to lead to
undue inducement or coercion of
participants?
• Can exclusion criteria be easily
verified?
• Are recruiters likely to game the
system?
• What impacts are incentives likely to
have in the long run?
• How can opportunities for individuals
to engage in undesirable behaviours
be minimised?
• What monitoring could be put in
place to ensure quality trial conduct?
• Evaluating the extent to which
potential unintended consequences
materialise in practice
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the literature on pay for performance in healthcare. Two
systematic reviews (one including a meta-analysis) con-
cluded that incentives linked to process indicators gener-
ally yielded greater quality improvements than incentives
linked to outcomes [27, 33].
The evidence from the literature on incentives to pro-
mote health behaviour change is weaker and more
mixed. A Cochrane systematic review of incentives for
smoking cessation found that in four trials specifically
targeting pregnant women, incentives linked to success-
ful quit attempts (outcome-contingent incentives) re-
sulted in higher quit rates than fixed payments for
attending antenatal appointments (non-contingent
process incentives) [34]. Conversely, a systematic review
and meta-analysis of incentives for weight loss amongst
obese populations found a weak although non-
statistically significant trend in favour of incentives
linked to behaviour change (process) rather than weight
loss (outcome) [35].
Conclusion
Incentives linked to processes have generally been found
to be more effective than those linked to outcomes, al-
though this evidence is from settings other than trial re-
cruitment and retention. There must be evidence of a
strong causal relationship between the incentivised
process and the desired outcome if process-based incen-
tives are to achieve the overall aim of increasing recruit-
ment or retention. Testing the relative benefits of
process and outcome incentives and of incentivising a
single metric compared to a range of measures would be
informative.
What form of incentive should be offered?
Earlier, we provided a very broad definition of incentives
as anything ‘that motivates or encourages someone to do
something’ [7]. In the context of trials, this might involve
different categories, including:
 Reimbursement for actual expenses incurred (e.g.
payment for a patient to travel to research visits,
screening)
 Reimbursement for opportunity costs (e.g. payment
for professional time spent discussing a study with a
prospective patient)
 Additional incentives to encourage desired
behaviour (e.g. prize lottery for completion of
research assessments)
Incentives can also take many forms, including:
 Cash or cash-like rewards (money, vouchers, reim-
bursement for expenses/time/uncomfortable proce-
dures, additional resources for recruiters, etc.)
 Social, emotional, or tokenistic rewards (gifts,
donation to charity)
 Reputational incentives, praise and social recognition
(such as authorship on research papers), and public
reporting
Theory
Incentives have two effects; the direct price effect which
makes the incentivised behaviour more attractive, and
an indirect psychological effect [8]. There are concerns
that the psychological effect may work in the opposite
direction to the price effect, crowding out the incenti-
vised behaviour. The provision of incentives can have an
indirect psychological effect by altering an individual’s
perception of the desired behaviour, for example leading
them to infer that it may be difficult or unpleasant [36].
Incentives may also signal a market relationship, chan-
ging an individual’s decision frame from social to monet-
ary, potentially crowding out their intrinsic motivation
[23]. It is unknown which effect will dominate, and this
may be context dependent. Providing rewards of a social
nature may limit the extent to which incentive provision
crowds out intrinsic motivation. Rewards viewed as a
‘splurge’ (such as a computer tablet) that an individual
would not normally buy for themselves can be perceived
as more valuable than the equivalent cash amount [32].
Evidence
A Cochrane systematic review and meta-analysis of
strategies to improve retention in randomised trials
found that whilst monetary incentives significantly in-
creased the response rate to postal (RR 1.18; 95% CI
1.09 to 1.28) and electronic (RR 1.25; 95% CI 1.14 to
1.38) questionnaires, there was no evidence that offering
non-monetary incentives increased retention compared
to no incentive (RR 0.99; 95% CI 0.95 to 1.03) [4]. There
was little evidence concerning incentives to improve par-
ticipant return to sites for follow-up.
Another Cochrane systematic review and meta-
analysis of methods to increase responses to postal and
electronic questionnaires in epidemiological studies
identified 13 trials specifically comparing the effective-
ness of monetary and non-monetary incentives [37].
Whilst this study did find that non-monetary incentives
were effective compared to no incentive, the odds of re-
sponse were almost doubled when using monetary in-
centives as opposed to non-monetary incentives (OR
1.87; 95% CI 1.73 to 2.04). Similarly, a meta-analysis of
the effectiveness of incentives on electronic health sur-
vey response found, by indirect comparison, that monet-
ary incentives had a stronger impact on response than
non-monetary incentives compared to a no-incentive
comparison (OR 2.43 vs OR 1.33) [38].
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Conclusion
The psychological effects of monetary incentives do not
appear to crowd out the direct price effect, at least when
incentives are directed at participants, with monetary in-
centives found to be more effective than non-monetary
incentives. Testing of the relative effectiveness of monet-
ary compared to non-monetary incentives for recruiters
is needed.
How large should the incentive be?
Theory
Theory suggests that performance will be positively re-
lated to incentive size. However, the marginal increases
in performance are expected to diminish as incentive
size grows, because of diminishing marginal utility of in-
come and because every unit of performance improve-
ment becomes harder to obtain than the last [39]. The
incentive recipient must be compensated for the incre-
mental net costs of undertaking the desired action [15].
When individuals are not fully in control of the rele-
vant outcomes, they require larger incentives to offset
the risk of failure [22]. This may mean that trials involv-
ing new treatments (where the outcomes for participants
are more uncertain) could require larger incentives.
However, incentives which are too large may cause eth-
ical challenges such as coercion, and could impair intrin-
sic motivation.
The relative importance of the incentive in relation to
other sources of income will also determine its effective-
ness in motivating agents [40]. It is therefore important
to consider how participants and recruiters are currently
reimbursed. A theoretical model for price setting in pay-
for-performance schemes shows that optimal prices
should reflect the marginal benefit to the payer of the
outcomes achieved, providers’ altruism, and the oppor-
tunity cost of public funds [41]. This framework could
be adapted for use in trials.
The size of incentives used in the literature is often
relatively modest [38], with a recent payment to UK pa-
tients of £100 [42]. Larger incentives could raise issues
around coercion, which are discussed in the NHS Health
Research Authority guidance [13], although the levels at
which an incentive becomes coercive is likely to depend
on the context, including the population, the burden as-
sociated with the trial, and the recruitment and retention
incentives.
Evidence
Two Cochrane systematic reviews and meta-analyses
found that higher-value incentives significantly increased
the odds of response to postal questionnaires [4, 37].
However, responses may differ when participants are re-
quired to attend in person.
Two systematic reviews and meta-analyses of the lit-
erature on health behaviour change concluded that there
was no evidence that larger incentives were associated
with greater behaviour change [43, 44].
The results from studies of pay for performance in
health care are mixed. Whilst four systematic reviews
found no clear relationship between incentive size and
performance [26, 27, 39, 45], a more recent systematic
review and meta-analysis estimated that the odds of
showing a positive effect were three times higher for
schemes with larger incentives [33].
Conclusion
In theory, larger incentives should be more effective.
However, the size of incentive needed will be very con-
text dependent, increasing in situations that require
more effort from participants and recruiters or involve
more risk. Ethical issues around the size of the incentive
require consideration; care should be taken that individ-
uals are not coerced into participation due to their per-
sonal circumstances, and a large incentive may signal
risk. The size of the incentive will determine the overall
cost of the scheme, and may therefore need to be re-
stricted. There is a need to provide evidence on the
cost-effectiveness of larger incentives, accounting for the
overall impact on study timelines and costs.
How should the incentive be structured?
Incentives are commonly thought of in relatively simple
terms, with a set amount of money linked to a given
task. However, there are many possible ways in which to
structure incentive systems, including:
1. Guaranteed payments versus lotteries
2. Bonuses versus penalties
(a) Bonuses – additional payments for performance
(b) Penalties – payments withheld for below-target
performance
(c) Deposit contracts – a hybrid where individuals
deposit bonuses which are only returned if they
meet their targets, and are forfeited if they fail
3. Absolute versus relative reward structure
(a) Absolute – payment for achieving a pre-defined
level of performance; all agents can potentially
receive the incentive
(b) Relative – a tournament where a percentage of
the top performers receive the incentive; agents
compete
4. Rewards for achievement levels versus
improvements in achievement
5. Graduated or tiered bonuses with incentives
triggered at multiple levels of performance
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6. Shared saving programme: savings to the
investigators resulting from reduced trial length or
attrition rates could be shared with recruiters
Whilst alternative structures such as lotteries could be
applied to both participants and recruiters, some design
options (such as relative reward structures) are only ap-
plicable to recruiters as these involve performance evalu-
ation across agents.
Theory
Along with incentive size, the incentive structure is cru-
cial in determining the total cost of the scheme. Lotter-
ies or tournaments provide budgetary certainty to the
investigator as a fixed amount will be paid out, and can
reduce overall costs as not all agents will receive incen-
tive payments. Relative performance evaluation across
agents can also filter out common risks (such as a small
number of eligible participants for certain treatments)
which may affect the absolute level of performance
achieved [46]. However, relative thresholds generate un-
certainty which can deter effort, since the level of per-
formance necessary to gain the reward in a tournament
is unknown [32]. When agents face different barriers to
recruitment and retention (such as varying eligible popu-
lations), or are considered to be risk averse, absolute
thresholds may be more effective [29].
Motivation depends on baseline performance, with
thresholds that are perceived as unachievable unlikely to
induce effort [47]. Conversely, if baseline performance
already exceeds the threshold, there is no incentive for
improvement. High fixed targets or tournaments based
on absolute performance will tend to reward current
high achievers, rather than induce additional effort from
low achievers [20]. A series of tiered thresholds or incen-
tives based on improvement in performance may there-
fore be more effective in inducing continuous effort than
one absolute threshold [32]. However, increasing the
complexity of an incentive scheme can weaken the be-
havioural response as it becomes more difficult for
agents to compute the likely relationship between effort
and reward [32].
Theory suggests that penalties should generate larger
impacts than bonuses as individuals are more sensitive
to losses [48]. However, penalties could put further
strain on under-resourced agents, and it may be difficult
to persuade agents to opt in to such schemes, or they
may opt out as soon as they experience losses.
Evidence
A Cochrane systematic review and meta-analysis con-
cluded that there was no clear evidence that guaranteed
monetary incentives were more effective than prize
draws for improving postal questionnaire response rates,
but this was based on just two studies [4].
A systematic review of systematic reviews of pay for
performance found that studies tend to find more posi-
tive effects when absolute rather than relative targets are
used, with results suggesting that multiple tiered targets
may contribute to positive effects [39]. For example, the
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) has a mini-
mum performance threshold below which no payment is
made, a maximum threshold above which no additional
payments are made, and a linear payment schedule in
between [49]. The same review concluded that there was
very little evidence on the relative effectiveness of bo-
nuses compared to penalties [39]. Just one relevant study
was identified, which found some evidence of increased
effectiveness for programmes based on ‘new money’ (bo-
nuses) compared to those relying on reallocation of
existing funds (effectively penalties) [27].
A systematic review and meta-analysis of patient in-
centives for changing health behaviours found that the
effect of financial incentives was not modified by attain-
ment certainty (guaranteed payments versus lotteries)
[44]. A Cochrane systematic review concluded that com-
parisons between reward-based and deposit-refund in-
terventions need further investigation as the current
evidence is lacking [34].
Conclusion
Incentive structure is crucial in determining the total
cost of the scheme. The evidence in this area is sparse,
but the most effective structure will likely vary by con-
text. For patient-directed incentives at least, the evidence
suggests there is no difference in effectiveness between
guaranteed and lottery-based incentives. Nevertheless,
these conclusions are based upon a limited number of
studies and so further research would be informative.
Repeat arrangements with recruiters may warrant ex-
ploration of more complex incentive structures, and
tests of different models should be a priority for future
research.
When, and how often, should payments be made?
Payments can be a one-off or split into multiple pay-
ments over time.
Theory
Behavioural economics suggests that a series of small in-
centives may be more psychologically motivating than a
single payment of the equivalent value [50]. Similarly, re-
ducing the time between the occurrence of the desired
behaviour and receipt of the linked incentive is also
theorised to increase the behavioural response, as indi-
viduals place greater value on things occurring in the
present than in the future. For example, payments to
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patients for clinic visits paid out at those visits should be
more effective than withholding the payments until the
end of the trial.
Evidence
Two systematic reviews concluded that upfront incen-
tives were significantly more effective than the promise
of the same incentive in the future in recruiting both
participants [37] and general practitioners [51] to par-
ticipate in research surveys. This finding was also con-
firmed in a Cochrane systematic review of incentives to
improve adherence to tuberculosis treatment [52]. A sys-
tematic review of pay-for-performance programmes also
provided some weak evidence that the timing of incen-
tives was related to effectiveness, finding that pro-
grammes without a delay in incentive payouts were all
relatively successful [53].
Conclusion
The timing of incentive receipt is important, with imme-
diate incentives generally found to be more effective
than those paid out in the future. The time between the
occurrence of the desired behaviour and incentive pay-
out should be minimised.
What are the potential unintended consequences?
The final aspect to consider is the potential conse-
quences of the chosen incentive. In addition to the
intended increases in recruitment and retention, the use
of incentives has the potential to induce a number of un-
intended consequences.
Ethical implications
Incentives may alter a participant’s decision-making
process, potentially resulting in failure to appropriately
make an informed choice about the risks and benefits of
participation and the balance between the two. Whilst
incentives are designed to alter the decision frame, eth-
ical issues may be raised if incentives are deemed to go
beyond motivation or encouragement, crossing the line
to coercion [13]. Financial incentives may raise ethical
issues if they lead to undue inducement, particularly
amongst participants who have lower incomes [54, 55].
Changes to patient composition and behaviour within the
trial
Incentives may induce different types of participants in
terms of both observable (e.g. income, age, illness sever-
ity, etc.) and unobservable (e.g. level of altruism) charac-
teristics. Whilst provision of incentives could improve
the generalisability of trial results if they attract a more
representative sample [42], they could also have adverse
effects. Care must be taken to keep monitoring trial
quality, as the provision of incentives is no guarantee
that activities will be conducted per protocol.
When exclusion criteria cannot easily be verified, fi-
nancial incentives may cause participants to conceal in-
formation [56]. Participants may also feel pressure to
report improved outcomes or neglect to tell researchers
about negative outcomes because they are being paid.
Not only could these potential unintended behaviours
affect the validity of trial outcomes, they could also put
participants and subsequent patients at risk.
Gaming
Rather than respond to the incentives by improving ef-
fort and performance, agents may simply make their
performance appear better through manipulation of the
reporting systems used to measure performance [57, 58].
This issue may be accentuated when recruiters are paid
by processes rather than outcomes, since they are gener-
ally self-reported and more easily manipulated [59]. For
example, if the incentive scheme was tied to recruitment
processes such as invitations, recruiters may over-report
the number of participants they have invited.
Legacy effects
Monetary incentives may change how tasks are per-
ceived by agents, weakening intrinsic motivation. As a
result, incentives may therefore be effective in the short
run but be counterproductive in the long run, causing
agents to pursue the desired outcomes less eagerly once
the incentive is removed than they would have done be-
fore it was introduced [8]. Providing incentives at re-
cruitment only could therefore have detrimental effects
on retention. This may also result in legacy effects,
where the provision of incentives becomes expected by
participants and recruiters. The provision of incentives
in one trial could therefore have detrimental effects on
effort levels for future non-incentivised trials. Alterna-
tively, incentivised activities can become ingrained in
routine behaviour and continue after the incentive is re-
moved, making future incentives superfluous.
Conclusion
In addition to the intended impacts, introducing incen-
tives for recruitment and retention has the potential to
induce unintended consequences which may affect trial
validity and outcomes. Incentives should be designed in
such a way as to minimise the opportunities for individ-
uals to engage in undesirable behaviours, and potential
unintended consequences should be identified early as
part of the trial design process. Along with evaluating
the effectiveness of incentives, future research should
also investigate the extent to which potential unintended
consequences materialise in practice. Incentives should
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be seen as a tool; other methodological processes should
be carefully monitored to ensure quality trial conduct.
Discussion
Main findings
Recruitment and retention of participants is critical for
trial success, yet both remain significant problems. This
paper aimed to provide guidance on the design and use
of incentives for participants and staff to improve re-
cruitment and retention in trials. Evidence both in terms
of the economic theory of incentives and the empirical
literature examining the use of incentives in healthcare
has been summarised, to offer guidance for those con-
sidering the use of incentives to improve trial recruit-
ment and retention.
The issues to consider when designing an incentive
system are summarised into an eight-question checklist
for trialists to use. These questions cover: the current in-
centives and barriers operating in the system; who the
incentive should be directed towards; what it should be
linked to; the form of incentive; the incentive size; the
structure of the incentive system; the timing and fre-
quency of incentive payout; and consideration of the po-
tential unintended consequences.
The evidence demonstrates that the design of incen-
tive systems can be very complex. Specific detail is often
overlooked, and all decisions may have both desired and
undesired consequences. Whilst not always effective, the
evidence shows that incentives can increase effort, but
how schemes are designed is a key determinant of their
effectiveness, and what works best is context specific.
Our guidance is designed to help to make these
decision-making processes more rigorous and transpar-
ent, and potentially increase effectiveness. Trialists are
encouraged to feed back on the utility of this tool to as-
sist with their trial design and conduct.
Strengths and limitations
The aim of this study was to identify literature relevant
for informing how best to design and implement incen-
tive schemes in clinical trials. We are not aware of any
other specific guidance in the literature, and this paper
therefore has the potential to inform further develop-
ments in this area. We combined theoretical and empir-
ical studies, and structured the review findings to
provide maximum transparency and clear guidance.
We conducted a ‘scoping review’ to map existing evi-
dence, and used that to develop initial guidance in a
checklist to assist decision-making about incentive de-
sign. The development of the checklist represents some-
thing of an extension to the usual outputs of a scoping
review – although identification of key concepts in a
content area is within the remit for a scoping review, the
development of practical guidance represents an
additional step. We highlight the preliminary nature of
our checklist, which is designed to stimulate teams to
structure their process when they design incentives, ra-
ther than make strong recommendations about the spe-
cifics of incentive design.
Our prior knowledge of this area suggested that a con-
ventional systematic review was unlikely to be fruitful
because of the lack of primary evidence [4, 5, 60]. In-
stead, we conducted a scoping review drawing on a
range of theoretical and empirical evidence, and devel-
oped guidance based on our interpretation of this evi-
dence base. This less restrictive approach allowed us to
bring together a wide range of both theoretical and em-
pirical literature from different settings in an informative
way to address our study aim. Where possible, we drew
on evidence from systematic reviews to ensure that our
conclusions were supported by rigorous evidence.
Nevertheless, it is important to be aware of the limita-
tions of this scoping review. Only three databases were
searched, and no formal quality assessment was under-
taken. Although the focus on systematic reviews and tri-
als would have meant that at least some quality appraisal
informed selection for the review, there was no formal
linking of the checklist content to the quality of the
underlying evidence (although the weight of evidence in
terms of number of studies was considered). This could
be managed through a fuller review of the literature, or
using methods for assessing expert opinions such as a
Delphi.
We excluded solely qualitative studies, due to limita-
tions in the resources available for the review and a need
to restrict the scope. Qualitative research is also less
prevalent within the economic literature which was our
focus. Nevertheless, qualitative studies could have a very
useful role to play in the development, implementation
and evaluation of incentives. They could allow explor-
ation of how incentive schemes are understood by pa-
tients and professionals, the potential operation of
perverse incentives, and the impact of ethical issues that
might be raised by their use [61]. We would certainly
encourage users of incentives schemes to embed qualita-
tive process work to explore these issues [62].
Making conclusions based on evidence from settings
other than trials requires caution as the effects of incen-
tives may be context specific. There may be justified
concerns about generalising results, as the behaviours
targeted in a lifestyle behaviour change intervention
(such as sustained changes to diet or exercise) are likely
to be different from the more episodic and time-limited
behaviour required in trials (such as clinic visits and
completion of outcomes measures). To minimise this
risk we have clearly identified such data in summaries.
Given the lack of reporting on the impact of incentive
scheme design, it was necessary to draw on this wider
Parkinson et al. Trials          (2019) 20:624 Page 11 of 14
literature as the primary evidence within trials is so lim-
ited. Researchers are encouraged to report their incen-
tive schemes, or otherwise make them available to assist
with future design.
Within the limited empirical evidence specific to the
area of trials, much of it examines incentives for ques-
tionnaire responses rather than strategies to improve re-
cruitment and retention when participants are required
to return to site for follow-up assessments. There was
also far more evidence on incentives directed at partici-
pants than at recruiters. The literature on pay for per-
formance in healthcare is likely to be most informative
in terms of recruiter incentives, as pay-for-performance
incentives tend to target providers rather than patients.
The evidence on health behaviour change largely exam-
ines patient-directed incentives.
There is more evidence on some incentive design is-
sues than others. For example, whilst it is fairly clear
that the literature supports the use of immediate rather
than delayed incentives, evidence on the most effective
incentive structure is sparse.
Finally, the focus of the literature is on increasing rates
of recruitment into trials, but it is also important to ex-
plore the types of patients recruited. There is increasing
concern about processes impacting on patient selection
into trials and the impact on external validity, and it will
be important to explore the effects of incentives on these
selection processes.
Implications
We have generated guidance for the development of in-
centives based on both economic theory and empirical
evidence, producing an eight-point checklist for scheme
designers to follow. This paper highlights just how com-
plex the design of incentive systems can be, and how
crucial each design choice is to overall effectiveness. The
most appropriate design choice will differ by situation,
and we have aimed to provide context-specific advice.
Next steps
Continued problems with recruitment and retention and
the significant sample size requirements of modern trials
highlight the need to develop and test innovative incen-
tive strategies alongside other mechanisms such as pa-
tient involvement and improved information for
participants. Although the evidence suggests that incen-
tives have the potential to improve both recruitment and
retention, there is a need for more evidence on both the
effectiveness and efficiency of different incentive
schemes to ensure that they are a good use of public
funds. Such evidence could be produced through em-
bedded studies within a trial [63], which are increasingly
supported by funders [64].
We have concluded the section on each design aspect
by highlighting the gaps in the current evidence base.
Whilst all design issues warrant further research, our
scoping review suggests that evidence is most needed on
incentives directed towards recruiters, optimal incentive
size, and tests of different incentive structures, particu-
larly exploring potential incentive structures for repeat
arrangements with recruiters.
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